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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION/CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW—OPT-OUT AND THE FOURTH ERA OF WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION: HAS INDUSTRY LEFT THE BARGAINING 
TABLE? 
Daniel E. Walker 
Over the past decade, state legislatures have been actively exploring 
politically feasible ways to lower workers’ compensation insurance costs 
on employers.  In 2013, Oklahoma made a bold move and adopted the 
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act (OEIBA) which enabled 
employers to “opt-out” of Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation system if 
they administered alternative benefit plans governed by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  The plans allowed for the 
retention of tort immunity for employers.  Ultimately, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held the OEIBA unconstitutional for violating the 
Oklahoma Constitution’s ban on “special laws.” 
This article outlines three distinct historical eras of state workers’ 
compensation and argues that we have now entered a fourth era, defined 
by the pursuit of state workers’ compensation alternatives.  By 
evaluating the successful legal challenges to the OEIBA, this article 
contemplates the feasibility of ERISA-governed alternative benefit plans 
and whether they can effectively retain workers’ compensation tort 
immunity and divest states from meaningful oversight of injured worker 
benefits. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is odd to think that after one hundred years of workers’ 
compensation, employers and employees are still fighting over how to pay 
 

Daniel E. Walker is appellate counsel for the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation 
(SAIF) and represents the state of Oregon as a Special Assistant Attorney General in workers’ 
compensation matters.  Daniel thanks Katharine Shove and the Western New England Law 
Review for their thoughtful work preparing this Article for publication. 
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benefits for injured workers.  Over the last century, labor and industry 
have welcomed new parties to the dispute, such as national insurance 
companies, third-party claim administrators, dedicated workers’ 
compensation managed care organizations (MCOs), independent medical 
examination companies, and numerous consultants.  With fifty states 
approaching workers’ compensation in fifty distinct and complex ways,1 
it is easy to see how even defenders of workers’ compensation have 
described the system as a “waste of time and money, [with] perverse 
motivations on both sides.”2 
The complexity and cost of workers’ compensation has led to 
renewed scrutiny of the foundational tenants of a tort alternative, no-fault 
benefit system.  While worker advocate groups and claimant attorneys 
have challenged the constitutionality of eroding worker benefits in state 
courts on state and federal equal protection and due process grounds, 
employers have successfully lobbied state legislatures for insurance 
premium cost cutting measures.3 
Most recently, the pursuit of deeper savings has led large national 
employers to band together in search of cost-effective alternatives to state 
workers’ compensation.  This Article explores the “opt-out movement” 
and the rise, fall, and likely return of alternative employee benefit systems. 
I. THE FIRST THREE ERAS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
“Opt-out” is a process utilized by employers to remove themselves 
from the workers’ compensation scheme through the implementation of 
 
1. THOMAS J. KELLEHER ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES PRAC. GUIDE WITH FORMS 
§ 10.11 (2d ed. 2018). 
2. David B. Torrey, The Opt-Out of Workers’ Compensation Legislation: A Critical 
Briefing and the Vasquez v. Dillard’s Case (2016), 52 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 39, 68–
69 (2016). 
3. Compare successful constitutional challenges to workers’ compensation statutes by 
claimants, such as Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2016) (holding that 
the Florida statute mandating a conclusive attorney fee schedule for workers’ compensation 
claims was grossly inadequate and amounted to an unconstitutional violation of due process 
under both state and federal constitutions); Rodriguez v. Brand W. Dairy, 378 P.3d 13, 32–33 
(N.M. 2016) (declaring the exclusion of farmworkers from the New Mexico workers’ 
compensation statute unconstitutional); and Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 
827, 841 (Pa. 2017) (finding the Pennsylvanian workers’ compensation statute’s designation of 
the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment for determining impairment an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); with legislative changes to curtail worker 
benefits, such as 2017 Iowa Legis. Serv. ch. 23 (West) (enabling employers to apportion liability 
from disability ratings to pre-existing injuries or prior employers); and 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws 
ch. 59, pt. NNN, § 15(3)(w) (McKinney). 
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employer administered “alternative benefit plans.”4  These plans give 
employers the freedom to devise their own system in order to deliver and 
adjudicate injured worker benefits with minimal oversight by state 
agencies.  Companies that build and administer opt-out plans in Texas 
began to lobby for the introduction of opt-out legislation in states that 
historically required employers to cover injured workers under state 
workers’ compensation statutes.5  The goal of such alternative benefit 
plans is to provide a cheaper free market alternative to state workers’ 
compensation insurance and, if possible, retain tort immunity for 
employers.6 
It is important to understand the etiology of American workers’ 
compensation law and the inadequate tort system it replaced to recognize 
what is at stake in the opt-out debate.  Workers’ compensation law has 
gone through three distinct eras marked by substantial change in the 
balance of worker benefits.  The first era began with the adoption of 
compulsory state statutory workers’ compensation schemes, followed by 
a second era of reforms during the Nixon administration and, most 
recently, a third era defined by rising premium costs and broad statutory 
claw backs of worker benefits.7 
As this Article argues, we have embarked on a fourth era of workers’ 
compensation—one defined by large national employers’ concerted 
efforts to create parallel benefit plans separate from state workers’ 
compensation schemes.  While the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in 
Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc. exposed a myriad of problems with divorcing 
injured worker benefits from state workers’ compensation,8 it is likely that 
over the next decade, many state legislatures will continue to consider 
 
4. Michael C. Duff, Are Workers’ Compensation “Alternative Benefit Plans” Authorized 
by State Opt-Out Schemes Covered by ERISA?, 45 BRIEF 22, 29 (2016). 
5. Molly Redden, Walmart, Lowe’s, Safeway, and Nordstrom Are Bankrolling a 
Nationwide Campaign to Gut Workers’ Comp, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 26, 2015, 3:47 PM), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/03/arawc-walmart-campaign-against-workers-
compensation [https://perma.cc/S6ED-YKKY]. 
6. See Howard Berkes & Michael Grabell, Opt-Out Plans Let Companies Work Without 
Workers’ Comp, NPR: MORNING EDITION (Oct. 14, 2015, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2015/10/14/448544926/texas-oklahoma-permit-companies-to-dump-worker-compensation-
plans [https://perma.cc/9PQL-T7SB]. 
7. See Alternative Benefit Systems and the Future of Workers’ Compensation, LEGAL 
TALK NETWORK: WORKERS COMP MATTERS (Aug. 25, 2016), https://legaltalknetwork.com/
podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2016/08/alternative-benefit-systems-future-workers-
compensation/ [https://perma.cc/KS2Z-F5QP] [hereinafter Alternative Benefit Systems] 
(discussing the prior three eras of workers’ compensation). 
8. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 768 (Okla. 2016). 
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business friendly “alternative benefit plans” as a cost-effective solution to 
rising cost of workers’ compensation premiums. 
A. The Plight of Injured Workers Prior to State-Mandated Workers’ 
Compensation 
Prior to 1911, an injured worker seeking a remedy for an industrial 
accident was required to bring grievances in civil court under common-
law tort, often negligence.  To succeed in their suit, a worker would have 
to establish that its employer failed to act with “due care” to prevent an 
injury or death to the worker and this negligence was the proximate cause 
of the worker’s injury.9  An employer could evince due care in the 
workplace by enforcing safety rules, providing safety equipment, warning 
employees of potential dangers, and hiring “suitable and sufficient” 
workers.10  If the fact finder determined the employer did not satisfy this 
standard of care, the employer could be considered negligent and liable 
for damages.11 
Over time, the common-law system began to favor employers 
through the development of three defenses to employer negligence: fellow 
servant exception, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence.12 
Established in the English common law case of Butterfield v. 
Forrester,13 and adopted in nineteenth-century America, contributory 
 
9. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 308 (1998). 
10. Id. at n.4 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85–87 (1987)). 
11. Id. at 308. 
12. John S. Haller, Jr., Industrial Accidents—Worker Compensation Laws and the 
Medical Response, 148 W. J. MED. 341, 342 (1988).  When scrutinizing tort law, and any law 
that motivates behavior, it is important to consider the economic incentives that drive individual 
or collective choice.  From a workplace safety perspective, common-law tort does not 
incentivize employers to create a safe work place for their employees.  Uninformed workers 
will often take on more risk in their workplace environment than is economically efficient.  This 
allows the employer to shift accident costs to the worker.  Therefore, under tort law, employers 
are incentivized to be as negligent as fiscally reasonable while their employees shoulder the 
brunt of financial exposure.  Furthermore, negligence, unlike no-fault liability, is fraught with 
caveats that sophisticated parties can mechanize as defenses to liability.  See Keith N. Hylton & 
Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers’ Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 109, 141 (1992). 
13. Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927.  The case illustrates the 
casualness with which the doctrine of contributory negligence entered the common law.  See 
Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (1908). 
There is . . . no discussion of general principles, no logical argument applying such 
principles to the particular facts and showing that they necessitate the result 
reached by the court.  All attempts to ascertain upon what legal principle the 
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negligence precluded workers from monetary recovery from work place 
injuries if they were found, in any way, negligently responsible for the 
injury.14  Employers were empowered to wield contributory negligence as 
a defense irrespective of job hazards or the percentage of negligence 
assigned the worker.15  Viewed today by most courts as a harsh result, 
pure contributory negligence has only survived for tort claims in a handful 
of jurisdictions.16 
The fellow servant rule discharged an employer from liability for 
workplace injuries “where the injury occurred as a result of the negligence 
of a coemployee engaged in the same common or general employment.”17  
Some commentators have ascribed the adoption of the fellow servant rule 
in America as the judiciary’s attempt to protect industry during the 
industrial revolution.18 
Assumption of risk, the third defense doctrine, was utilized in 
nineteenth-century employment contracts as a waiver of liability for 
employers.19  The principle held that, either expressed in writing or 
implied through actions, workers knowingly assume the risks associated 
with the employment and therefore waive their rights to sue their 
 
defense of contributory negligence is based, are therefore efforts ex post facto, to 
explain and account for a result already reached apparently unconsciously. 
Id. 
14. See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 
YALE L.J. 697, 719 (1978). 
15. A booming hazardous industry of the nineteenth century, railroads were notorious for 
using contributory negligence as a defense to liability.  See Pa. R.R. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149–
50 (1854) (“It has been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in 
all time to come, that there can be no recovery for an injury caused by the mutual default of both 
parties.”). 
16. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia still 
prescribe to pure contributory negligence.  See generally, e.g., John R. Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. 
Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 381 (Ala. 1990); Ala. Power Co. v. Scholz, 215 So.2d 447, 451 (Ala. 
1968); Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977); Bd. of Cty. Comm’r v. Bell 
Atlantic, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (Md. 1997); Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504, 506 
(N.C. 1980); Baskett v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1947). 
17. BARRY A. LINDAHL, 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 43:9 (2d 
ed.).  This rule was first pronounced in the English common law court in Priestley v. Fowler 
(1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032–33, and subsequently used in the United States, in Murray v. 
S.C. R.R., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385, 400 (1841).  Monique N. Thoresz, Note, Cooper v. City 
of New York: The Fellow Servant Rule—Wanted Dead or Alive, 15 PACE L. REV. 911, 914 
(1995). 
18. See Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837–
1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580–81 (1984); Thoresz, supra note 17, at 914. 
19. Assumption of risk is sometimes colloquially referred to as “the worker’s right to die” 
or “death contracts.”  See Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’ Compensation, 19 
IOWA ORTHOPEDIC J. 106, 106–07 (1999). 
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employer for injuries associated with the employment.  The wide latitude 
given to the assumption of risk defense aided expanding industries during 
the industrial revolution, allowing them to sidestep bearing the business 
cost of “human overhead.”20 
B. The First Era: Reform and the “Grand Bargain” 
By the early twentieth century, the imbalance between employer 
protections and worker remedies began to pique the attention of activists 
and media outlets to look towards Germany as a potential model for an 
American workers’ compensation system.21 
Unlike Germany, where compulsory insurance for injured workers 
was created and facilitated by the national government, United States 
federalism principles fostered a patchwork of competing state laws.22  
Industry as a whole was opposed to state-by-state regulation that would 
allow competitors in unregulated jurisdictions an economic advantage.23  
In response, in 1910, a conference convened in Chicago between 
representatives of state labor commissions and industry leaders to address 
the lack of uniformity in state laws and produce a uniform workmen’s 
compensation law.24 
State legislatures responded narrowly at first by creating accident 
funds for certain occupations, such as for miners in Maryland25 and 
Montana,26  and compulsory insurance coverage for a wide range of 
dangerous occupations in New York.27  These legislative attempts were 
dismantled by their respective state courts on both federal and state 
constitutional grounds.28  State judiciaries were specifically worried with 
the idea of employer liability without fault, which the Court of Appeals of 
New York described, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, as “taking 
 
20. Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943). 
21. LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND TEXT 20–21 (5th ed. 2013); Guyton, supra note 19, at 107–08. 
22. See Haller, supra note 12, at 341–43.  In one example, phosphorus match 
manufacturers openly testified before Congress that, irrespective of the widespread poisoning 
of their workers, they refused to invest in alternative compounds unless every state mandated it.  
Id. 
23. Id. at 343. 
24. See JAMES HARRINGTON BOYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR 
INJURIES TO WORKMEN 17–22 (1913) (providing an account of this conference). 
25. Act of Apr. 1, ch. 139, 1902 Md. Laws 218. 
26. 1909 Mont. Laws Ch. 67. 
27. 1910 N.Y. Laws 1633–37. 
28. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 17. 
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the property of A. and giving it to B., and that cannot be done under our 
Constitutions.”29 
Concerned that passing compulsory workers’ compensation schemes 
would raise constitutional concerns under the Takings Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, states passed voluntary, non-compulsory 
workers’ compensation laws.  These statutes did not compel employers to 
participate in workers’ compensation schemes; however, employers who 
chose not to participate in their state’s scheme were left open to civil 
liability.30 
This changed in 1917, with the Supreme Court case New York Central 
Railroad Co. v. White.31  In his opinion, Justice Pitney not only dismantled 
any Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process concerns surrounding 
no-fault workers’ compensation32 but also outlined the necessity of a quid 
pro quo arrangement between labor and industry.33  As discussed in Part 
III of this Article, the foundation of the Court’s opinion and the necessity 
of the quid pro quo arrangement are directly challenged by the opt-out 
movement.34 
With the constitutionality of compulsory workers’ compensation 
decided by New York Central Railroad Co., states began rapidly adopting 
and refining workers’ compensation schemes.  By the conclusion of 1920, 
forty-two states had enacted workers’ compensation statutes.35  The last 
 
29. Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 440 (N.Y. 1911). 
30. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 22. 
31. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203–05 (1917). 
32. Id. at 196, 204–05.  Justice Pitney explains that employee injury is a “probable and 
foreseen result” of an employer’s business and, therefore, no-fault liability does not implicate 
the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 205. 
33. Id. at 203–04.  Justice Pitney elegantly outlines the quid pro quo trade-off of workers’ 
compensation by arguing that it is practical pursuant to natural justice. 
[I]t is not unreasonable for the state . . . to require [the employer] to contribute a 
reasonable amount and according to a reasonable and definite scale, by way of 
compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common enterprise, 
irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest 
where it may chance to fall,— [sic] that is, upon the injured employee or his 
dependents. 
Id. at 203. 
34. See infra Part III. 
35. Christopher J. Boggs, Workers’ Compensation History: The Great Tradeoff!, INS. J. 
(Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/03/19/
360273.htm [https://perma.cc/A7VU-PV74].  Alaska and Hawaii both enacted workers’ 
compensation statutes prior to 1920 but were not recognized as states until 1959.  Id. 
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state to enact a workers’ compensation statute was Mississippi, which held 
out until 1948.36 
State court systems took a narrow view of what type of injuries should 
be covered during the early days of workers’ compensation.37  Over time, 
workers’ compensation law evolved to encompass not only accidental 
injuries but also occupational diseases and stress-related mental 
disabilities.38 
C. The Second Era: Involvement of the Federal Government 
Whether due to states’ concerns for their own citizens or the 
administrative costs associated with federal preemption, workers’ 
compensation has always been regulated and administered by the states.  
As such, the procedural process and benefits available to injured workers 
is not uniform among the states.39 
After sixty years of workers’ compensation, it became apparent that 
many, if not most, state workers’ compensation systems were not 
delivering statutorily promised benefits in a fair and effective manner as 
they were designed to do.40  The federal government, through the National 
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (“Commission”) 
submitted a report in 1972 on the state of workers’ compensation.41  The 
Commission, which was made up of a wide variety of industry, labor, 
medical and insurance parties, proposed essential elements for all state 
workers’ compensation schemes.42  The report urged the states to adopt 
 
36. Id. 
37. Thomas S. Cook, Workers’ Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and 
Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 883–84 (1986).  Early workers’ 
compensation only covered “sudden, unexpected, incidents attributable to a specific time and 
place.”  Id. at 884–85. 
38. See id. at 886–89. 
39. See Workers’ Compensation Law—State by State Comparison, NFIB (June 7, 2017) 
https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-compliance/legal/workers-compensation-laws-state-by-
state-comparison-57181/ [https://perma.cc/N5BH-YUUP] (showing the substantive and 
procedural differences between how the states approach workers’ compensation). 
40. Alternative Benefit Systems, supra note 7 (“[W]hen the workers’ comp[.] law was first 
enacted in New York, the Supreme Court said that the workers’ comp[.] laws must provide 
significant benefits to the injured workers.  And when we got into the 1960s and early 1970s, 
many states’ benefits were not significant.”). 
41. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 24.  Congress created the Commission 
through the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OSHA).  Members of the fifteen-
person board were appointed by the president.  Id. 
42. See generally REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS. 
NO. 72–600195 5–6 (1972) [hereinafter NAT’L COMM’N].  A total of twenty or so 
recommendations were submitted in whole.  Id.  Some of these elements included: 
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the Commission’s suggestions and dangled the prospect of federal action 
if none was taken by 1975.43 
“State legislators took the Commission’s [proposals] seriously” and 
most of the states retooled their workers’ compensation statutes to address 
the Commission’s report.44  Annexation of workers’ compensation into 
the federal administrative state would effectively eliminate, to some 
degree, the private insurance market and create a Social Security-like 
benefit system administered by the federal government.  Multiple bills 
were put to Congress to implement minimum standards for state workers’ 
compensation statutes, some of which were beyond the recommendations 
of the Commission.45  None were successful. 
The changes adopted by the states as a result of the Commission’s 
report marked what some have called “the most dramatic liberalization 
[by the states] of state compensation statutes in history.”46  The political 
pendulum had swung, this time in favor of injured workers. 
By the late 1960s, private pension plans had grown in popularity with 
employers as a “way[] to augment compensation in the face of wage and 
price controls.”47  Concerned with the mismanagement, financial stability, 
and oversight of private benefit plans, Congress passed the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.48  ERISA brought 
comprehensive changes for all employee benefit plans provided by private 
employers or employee organizations by imposing “a uniform set of 
 
[C]ompulsory coverage in all acts; elimination of all numerical and occupational 
exemptions to coverage; . . . full coverage of work-related diseases; full medical 
and physical rehabilitation services without arbitrary limits; a broad extra-
territoriality provision; elimination of arbitrary limits on duration of total sum of 
benefits; and a weekly benefit maximum that rises from an immediate [sixty-six 
and two-thirds] percent to an ultimate [two hundred] percent of average weekly 
wage in the state. 
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 24. 
43. JAMES ROBERT CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: THE ROLE OF 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 49 (1977). 
44. See Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is 
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1087–88 (1999). 
45. Scott D. Szymendera, Workers’ Compensation: Overview and Issues, CONG. RES. 
SERV. 1, 20–21 (2017).  “In 1973, S. 2088, introduced by Senators Harrison Williams and Jacob 
Javits, would have created minimum standards for state workers’ compensation systems” which 
required, among other things, “no duration or monetary limit on total disability benefits paid; 
[and] no duration or monetary limit on medical or rehabilitation benefits.”  Id. at 24. 
46. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 24. 
47. Stephen E. Ehlers & David R. Wise, So What’s ERISA All About?: A Concise Guide 
for Labor and Employment Attorneys, 77 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 22, 22 (2005). 
48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 
(1974). 
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requirements regarding standards of conduct, responsibility, and 
obligations under such plans.”49 
Plans governed by ERISA fall into two categories: pension plans and 
welfare plans.  Pension plans provide retirement income to employees or 
allow for deferred income,50 whereas welfare plans include most other 
employee benefits.51  Generally, employee benefit plans regulated by 
ERISA are plans provided by “a single employer, by groups of employers 
(multiple employer plans) and by unions and employers together (multi-
employer plans),” while government and church plans are generally 
exempt.52 
ERISA gets it teeth from the act’s far-reaching preemption scheme.53  
If a benefit plan falls within ERISA, there is the potential for a host of 
state laws that would normally apply to be preempted.54  ERISA does 
carve out an exemption for state laws that regulate insurance.55  Though, 
self-insured benefit plans are considered outside of state laws that regulate 
insurance and thus are entitled to ERISA preemption.56 
At issue in this Article is ERISA’s relationship with workers’ 
compensation.  By the time of ERISA’s adoption in 1974, almost every 
state required employers to either purchase workers’ compensation plans 
or self-insure their employees pursuant to state workers’ compensation 
 
49. KATHRYN J. KENNEDY & PAUL T. SHULTZ III, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: 
QUALIFICATIONS AND ERISA REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012). 
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2018). 
51. Id. § 1002(1) (including in the welfare plan benefits classes such as medical, sickness, 
accident, disability, death, unemployment, vacation benefits, apprenticeship, training programs, 
day care centers, scholarship funds, and prepaid legal services). 
52. Ehlers & Wise, supra note 47, at 23; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)–(33) (providing the 
definition of “government plan” and “church plan”). 
53. Generally, “[f]ederal preemption is the [negation] of state laws that conflict with 
federal law.”  NICOLE HUBERFELD ET AL., THE LAW OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 177 (2017).  
The doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.  Preemption 
is accomplished in three ways: (1) Congress has used express statutory language to preempt 
state law, (2) Congress has implied preemption when compliance with both state and federal 
law would lead to an absurd result, or (3) if Congress has so regulated a specific field the courts 
may conclude that federal law “occupies the field” and there is no room for state regulation.  
HUBERFELD, supra. 
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018) (“[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar 
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”); see also HUBERFELD, 
supra note 53. 
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt 
or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or 
securities.”). 
56. UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 367 n.2 (1999) (“Self-insured ERISA 
plans . . . are generally sheltered from state insurance regulation.”). 
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statutes.57  Congress explicitly excluded employee benefit plans from 
ERISA that were “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with 
applicable workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment 
compensation or disability insurance laws.”58  By excluding workers’ 
compensation from ERISA, states continued to have complete control 
over the procedures and adjudication of workers’ compensation benefits. 
D. The Third Era: Addressing Rising Employer Costs 
Since the codification of workers’ compensation by the states, 
concerns over the quality and accessibility of worker benefits have often 
been considered secondary to the cost of workers’ compensation 
insurance premiums for employers.59  State legislatures have regularly 
taken the stance that workers’ compensation is a burden on employers 
instead of viewing it as a negotiated bargain with workers.60  Therefore, 
the cost of workers’ compensation assumed by employers often incites 
more conversation than benefits forfeited by injured workers.61 
Prior to the 1970s, workers’ compensation insurance (or the costs 
associated with being self-insured) was not a high-line item on employer 
budgets.62  With the expansion of benefits, the type of workers covered, 
and ballooning health care costs, state legislatures began feeling pressure 
 
57. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 21, at 23–24 (noting that by 1949 every state in the 
lower forty-eight had adopted workers’ compensation acts except Mississippi). 
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2018). 
59. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation 
“Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 690 (1998) (arguing that states have disproportionately 
addressed workers’ compensation regarding the “impact of workers’ compensation costs on 
their state’s ‘business climate’” over the adequacy of injured worker benefits). 
60. See Press Release, George A. Amedore, Jr., N.Y. State Senator, Senators Call for 
Sensible Workers’ Comp Reform in Budget (Mar. 22, 2017) https://www.nysenate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/george-amedore-jr/senators-call-sensible-workers-comp-reform-
budget [https://perma.cc/2CGX-NGQJ].  New York senate assembly member John T. 
McDonald III has recently stated, “[e]mployers, small and large, continue to struggle with the 
high cost burden of workers’ compensation cost.  It is the number one or two concern in their 
business.”  Id. 
61. See McCluskey, supra note 59, at 681 (1998).  “[T]he original workers’ compensation 
bargain was distorted [during the 1970’s and 1980’s] because of an expansion of workers’ 
benefits and the increased costs of administering a system with more generous benefits covering 
a wide range of injuries” which subsequently lead states to implement cost cutting mechanisms.  
Id. 
62. See Leslie I. Boden, Workers’ Compensation in the United States: High Costs, Low 
Benefits, 16 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 189, 190 (1995) (describing how many state legislatures 
began to focus on the adequacy of worker benefits in the 1970s, which resulted in the average 
worker’s compensation cost to grow from 1.1% to 2.6% of payroll). 
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to address employer concerns over rising premiums.63  Some states, such 
as Oregon, introduced higher legal burdens for workers to establish the 
compensability of certain injuries.64  Access to workers’ compensation 
benefits was further curtailed by the introduction of managed care 
organizations (MCOs) to contain health costs and the passage of statutory 
measures aimed at reducing attorney involvement in claim litigation.65 
II. THE FOURTH ERA AND THE OPT-OUT MOVEMENT 
Unlike the past three eras of workers’ compensation, when worker 
benefits and employer costs were negotiated within the confines of state 
statutes, the fourth era is marked by large employers pushing legislation 
that exempts participation within such statutes through ERISA 
preemption.  As discussed below in this Part, parties have successfully 
invoked state constitutional doctrines, such as equal protection and the 
prohibition against special laws, to protect workers’ compensation statutes 
from ERISA preemption. 
A. Alternative Benefit Plans in Texas 
The origin of the opt-out movement can be traced to Texas.  While 
Texas does have a workers’ compensation statute administered by the 
Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, it is the only state where 
workers’ compensation is not compulsory under state statute.66  Texas 
 
63. See McCluskey, supra note 59, at 705–06. 
64. In occupational disease claims, the worker must prove the work exposure is the “major 
contributing cause,” or fifty-one percent or more of the cause, of the condition.  If at any time 
an injury combines with a qualified preexisting condition the worker must show that the injury 
was the “major contributing cause” of the “combined condition.”  OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 656.005(7)(a) (2018) (“[T]he combined condition is compensable only if . . . the otherwise 
compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined 
condition . . . .”).  Compared with the “material cause” standard in which a condition is 
compensable if the injury played a “material” role in the condition.  The adoption of the “major 
contributing cause” standard in occupational diseases and combined conditions blocked claims 
from ever entering the workers’ compensation system, effectively leaving workplace injuries 
that do not meet the burden without a remedy.  Vigor Indus., LLC v. Ayres, 310 P.3d 674, 676, 
681 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the major contributing cause of a combined condition was 
when the injury is a greater cause than the qualified preexisting condition). 
65. For example, legislation in Oregon from the 1980s to 1996 reduced the number of 
claims by twelve to twenty-four percent and benefits by twenty to twenty-five percent.  Terry 
Thomason & John F. Burton, Jr., The Effects of Changes in the Oregon Workers’ Compensation 
Program on Employees’ Benefits and Employers’ Costs, 1 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POL’Y 
REV. 7, 10 (August 7, 2001), made available at http://workerscompresources.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/JA01.pdf. 
66. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2017) (“Except for public employers and 
as otherwise provided by law, an employer may elect to obtain workers’ compensation 
 
WALKER. MACRO. 1.16.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM  10:38 PM 
2019] OPT-OUT AND THE FOURTH ERA OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 123 
employers may elect to pass on workers’ compensation coverage, though 
they forfeit tort immunity by doing so.67  Therefore, if a Texas employer 
runs a cost-benefit analysis and decides that the cost of workers’ 
compensation insurance outweighs exposure to civil litigation costs and 
tort damages, he may pass on the exclusive remedy of workers’ 
compensation. 
Since the 1980s, self-insured plans utilizing ERISA have been 
available in the Texas market.68  To utilize these plans, employers would 
elect against Texas workers’ compensation coverage and become non-
subscribing employers.69  Normally, non-subscribing employers under 
Texas law are exposed to tort liability.70  In order to minimize this liability, 
non-subscribing employers conditioned employment on the acceptance of 
arbitration agreements for common law claims.71  Texas courts upheld 
these agreements based on the reasoning in West Texas Express v. 
Guerrero, that an “arbitration agreement . . . did not actually waive 
[claimant’s] right to sue, [and that the claimant] merely agreed to a 
particular forum for resolution of his cause of action.”72  Commentators 
have further noted that these arbitration agreements are possible in Texas 
because the Texas courts have held that “when [what amounts to] a pre-
injury waiver of common law claims is included in an arbitration 
 
insurance coverage.”) (emphasis added); Kirk D. Willis, Why Smart Employers Opt Out from 
Texas Workers’ Compensation Coverage Under V.T.C.A. Labor Code § 406.002(A), 38 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 117, 120 (2012) (noting that Texas is the only state that does not require 
employers to subscribe to workers’ compensation). 
67. See Willis, supra note 66, at 125 (explaining that an employer who chooses against 
providing workers’ compensation coverage for their employees (referred to under Texas law as 
a “nonsubscriber”) “is subject to negligence liability associated with a work[place] injury”). 
68. PETER ROUSMANIERE & JACK ROBERTS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OPT-OUT: CAN 
PRIVATIZATION WORK? 1, 45–46 (2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/wc-opt-out-
report-11-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/PME2-WRJF]. 
69. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2017) (describing the Texas statutory 
mechanism to become a non-subscribing employer). 
70. See Taff v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 331 F.2d 405, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1964). 
Under Texas law, an employee is allowed to sue [an] employer in tort for injuries 
caused by the employer’s negligence, if the employer while eligible to subscribe 
to the Texas Workmen’s Compensation system has chosen not to do so.  In such 
case, a defendant employer is deprived of the traditional common law defenses of 
contributory negligence, assumed risk, and follow-servant [sic] rule. 
Id.; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West 2017). 
71. See Jason Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of Innovation?, 2 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323, 343–44 (2011); Nathan E. Ross, How Level is the Playing 
Field? Should Employers Be Able to Circumvent State Workers’ Compensation Schemes by 
Creating Their Own Employee Compensation Plans?, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 439, 439, 442–43 
(2000). 
72. W. Tex. Express v. Guerrero, 511 S.W.3d 106, 117 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 
WALKER. MACRO. 1.16.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM  10:38 PM 
124 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:111 
agreement, the [Texas] statutory prohibition against pre-injury waivers is 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”73 
Functionally, at will employees who sign employment arbitration 
agreements are precluded from bringing negligence suits for on-the-job 
injuries in civil court.74  Furthermore, since the employers in these 
scenarios have opted out of workers’ compensation coverage, their injured 
workers are precluded from seeking benefits under the Texas workers’ 
compensation statute.  As a result, an injured worker’s only path to a 
remedy is to go through arbitration under the employer’s alternative 
benefit plan. 
Unsurprisingly, large employers with the resources to put together 
self-insured alternative benefit plans found instant savings on insurance 
premiums or the cost associated with being self-insured under the Texas 
workers’ compensation statute.75  Alternative benefit plans operate much 
like other benefit offerings (such as retirement plans, group-term life 
insurance plans and health plans), and, due to ERISA preemption, the state 
is unable to effectively regulate the contents of the plan.76 
B. The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act 
While some states, such as Oregon, have successfully curbed 
premiums, many states struggle with rising workers’ compensation 
costs.77  With an environment ripe for further legislative intervention, the 
door was open for changes in states that wanted to promote a pro-business 
environment to attract large employers. 
 
73. Ohana, supra note 71, at 344; see In re Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd., Nos. 01-07-00003-
CV, 01-07-00029-CV, 2008 WL 2548568, at *10 (Tex. App. June 26, 2008) (“We . . . now hold 
that the FAA preempts any potential application of the Texas non-waiver provision stated in 
Labor Code section 406.033(e) to prevent enforcement of the arbitration clause stated in [the 
Labor Code].”); In re Border Steel, Inc., 229 S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tex. App. 2007) (“[T]he FAA 
preempts the application of the Texas non-waiver provision to prevent the enforcement of the 
Arbitration Agreement at issue here.”). 
74. See sources cited supra note 73. 
75. Torrey, supra note 2, at 44; see Alison D. Morantz, Opting Out of Workers’ 
Compensation in Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in REGULATION VS. 
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 197, 199–200 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 
2010). 
76. See Section II.C. 
77. See CHRIS DAY ET AL., DEP’T. OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., 2016 OREGON 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PREMIUM RATE RANKING SUMMARY (2016), 
https://www.oregon.gov/dcbs/reports/Documents/general/prem-sum/16-2082.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S5HD-25Q6].  California, the state with most expensive index rate at $3.24 
per $100 of payroll, is at 176 percent of the median compared to North Dakota, the state with 
the least expensive index rate at $0.89 per $100 of payroll, at 48 percent of the mean.  
Oklahoma’s index rate is at $2.23 per $100 of payroll and 121 percent of the mean.  Id. 
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It is with this backdrop that, in 2011, Oklahoma Governor Mary 
Fallin appointed a working group to examine and rewrite Oklahoma’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act.  The working group was tasked with 
codifying case law that had developed since the 1977’s workers’ 
compensation reforms.78  Through the working group’s efforts and 
without much controversy, Oklahoma Senate Bill 878 was created and 
eventually passed as the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Code.79 
Proponents of Texas-like workers’ compensation alternative benefit 
plans began lobbying for an opt-out alternative in Oklahoma before the 
full effects of the new Workers’ Compensation Code could be felt.80  In 
2013, their efforts proved successful when Oklahoma passed the 
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act (OEIBA), also referred to as the 
Opt-Out Act.81  The OEIBA allowed employers who were certified as 
“qualified employers” to remove themselves from Oklahoma’s workers’ 
compensation system if they set up written benefit plans to cover work 
injuries for employees.82  The requirements for becoming a “qualified 
employer” included providing a written private benefit plan to the 
Insurance Commissioner and paying an annual $1,500 filing fee.83  Unlike 
Texas, “qualified employer[s]” retained the same tort immunity held by 
employers who remained under Oklahoma workers’ compensation 
statute.84 
 
78. Bob Burke, The Evolution of Workers’ Compensation Law in Oklahoma: Is the Grand 
Bargain Still Alive?, 41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 337, 392 (2016). 
79. 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 2553 (repealed 2013); see Tish Sommer, Bill Summary, OKLA. 
WORKERS’ COMP. CT. OF EXISTING CLAIMS (June 1, 2011), http://www.owcc.state.ok.us/
PDF/LegChanges/SB878_Summary%20of%20Enacted_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFH8-
NSD6] (providing a section-by-section explanation of the Workers’ Compensation Code).  At 
the time, Sommer was Special Counsel for the Workers’ Compensation Court.  Administrative 
Law Judges, OKLA. WORKERS COMPENSATION COMM’N, https://www.ok.gov/wcc/
About_the_Commission/Administrative_Law_Judge_Bios/ [https://perma.cc/LK6S-5GA8]. 
80. See Burke, supra note 78, at 413–16 (noting that the legislative changes were driven 
by many of Oklahoma’s largest employers, such as Hobby Lobby, Quick Trip, Sysco, Dollar 
General, Auto Zone and Best Buy). 
81. Id. at 414–15. 
82. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 202 (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381 P.3d 
768 (Okla. 2016). 
83. Id. § 202(B); see also ROUSMANIERE & ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 58. 
84. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 209(B) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381 
P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016) (“[A] qualified employer is only subject to liability in any action brought 
by a covered employee or his or her dependent family members for injury resulting from an 
occupational injury if the injury is the result of an intentional tort on the part of the qualified 
employer.”). 
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C. The Allure of Opt-Out 
State workers’ compensation schemes are often singled out by pro-
business advocates as inefficient, costly, and easily abused by workers.85  
Besides cost savings for employers, opt-out proponents have argued that 
alternative benefit plans are superior to state workers’ compensation 
systems for the following reasons: management of medical treatment, 
employee accountability, competition of differing plans, and removal 
from bureaucratic administrative law proceedings.86  Yet the true selling 
point of opt-out plans for large employers is that they provide what 
effectively functions as employer-controlled arbitration of personal injury 
tort claims. 
The legality and proliferation of workplace arbitration agreements, as 
noted in Texas, is nothing new.87  The Supreme Court’s 2012 enunciation 
in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown that personal injury suits 
could be covered by arbitration agreement further opened the door for the 
opt-out movement.88  While scholars have noted that “[t]ort values are 
difficult to square with notions of arbitration contracts”89 because of the 
unknown “extent of a subsequently suffered injury,”90 recent Supreme 
Court decisions upholding the Federal Arbitration Act in employment 
contracts suggests arbitration may continue to expand into the tort realm.91 
 
85. ROUSMANIERE & ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 6 (“The opt-out concept arises from 
employers’ belief that statutory workers’ compensation systems are inherently and excessively 
costly and burdened with fraud and abuse.”). 
86. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 48–52. 
87. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015); Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. 
Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20–22 (2012); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 
(1985); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1983), for 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s long-held enforcement of arbitration agreements under the Federal 
Arbitration Act; supra Section II.A. 
88. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533–34 (2012). 
89. Michael C. Duff, Worse than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A State’s Authority to 
Opt-Out of the Quid Pro Quo, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 123, 127 (2016) 
[hereinafter Worse than Pirates]; see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 
273 (2004) (arguing that, taken to an extreme, the enforcement of arbitration clauses diminishes 
tort policy considerations). 
90. Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 127. 
91. The Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams held that the 
Federal Arbitration Act, applied to all workers engaged in interstate commerce with the 
exception of certain interstate transportation workers, such as railroad employees or seamen.  
532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001); see Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 127 (“Even during the peak 
of industrialism . . . some late nineteenth century courts refused to enforce pre-injury waivers 
of tort suits.”); see also Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More 
Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2009) (“Because the 
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Opt-out plans also offer the solution of effectively stopping claims 
from getting in the door.  For example, opt-out plans try to remove benefit 
plan claim disputes from oversight by independent state agencies through 
ERISA preemption.  Under the alternative benefit plans, injured workers 
are required to appeal their denied claims to an arbitration committee 
through a written appeal, often without the aid of a hearing or counsel.92  
Unlike a neutral agency-employed Administrative Law Judge, who 
reviews the facts surrounding a workplace injury through evidence and 
testimony, opt-out plans allow the employer to appoint whomever they 
want as the initial fact finder.  This is problematic because appellate courts 
often only retain de novo review of legal issues in a case and do not make 
findings of fact.  Often, on review in workers’ compensation cases, higher 
courts are bound to a deferential standard of review of the administrative 
fact finder, which makes the employer’s control of fact finding a powerful 
tool.93 
Since opt-out plans exist in a free market with firms vying for 
business, plans are often crafted to be more competitive by limiting 
benefits, employee rights, and medical care choices.  For example, only 
forty-one percent of Texas opt-out plans include death benefits for the 
beneficiary of fatal claims.94  Even more concerning, one approved 
Oklahoma opt-out plan required injured workers to report their injury to 
the plan administrator within twenty-four hours or the injured worker 
 
Court will not do it and the Court has determined that state legislatures cannot do it, any reform 
of the current system regarding enforceable contracts and procedures governing arbitration must 
come from Congress . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
92. The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act states: 
The claimant may appeal in writing an initial adverse benefit determination to an 
appeals committee within one hundred eighty (180) days following his or her 
receipt of the adverse benefit determination.  The appeal shall be heard by a 
committee consisting of at least three people that were not involved in the original 
adverse benefit determination.  The appeals committee shall not give any deference 
to the claimant’s initial adverse benefit determination in its review. 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(1) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 381 P.3d 
768 (Okla. 2016). 
93. David B. Torrey, Master or Chancellor? The Workers’ Compensation Judge and 
Adjudicatory Power, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 21, 113–22 (2012) (describing 
how, either through law or practice, appellate courts in multiple jurisdictions defer to the factual 
findings of state commission charged with originally adjudicating workers’ compensation 
cases). 
94. Jay Root, Behind the Texas Miracle, a Broken System for Broken Workers, TEX. TRIB. 
(June 29, 2014), http://apps.texastribune.org/hurting-for-work/ [https://perma.cc/FWZ4-E84K].  
Michael Duff points out the irony as Texas is near the top of the national workplace death rates 
in recent years.  Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 137. 
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would be procedurally barred from bringing the claim.95  Effectively, 
injured workers who did not know they were injured, or failed to 
immediately attribute their injury to work, were barred from benefits 
under their plan.  Further, due to their employer’s tort immunity, workers 
were barred from seeking civil damages.96 
Opt-out plans were also used to drop some injuries that were covered 
under Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation scheme.  Under Oklahoma’s 
workers’ compensation statute, “compensable injury” is defined as 
injuries that occur during the course or in the scope of a worker’s 
employment, with some minor exceptions.97  However, under opt-out 
plans governed by the OIEBA, cumulative trauma injuries and 
occupational exposure diseases, which meet the definition of 
“compensable injury,” were allowed to be left off employer plans.98  For 
example, an employer who manufactured toxic cleaning chemicals could 
refuse to cover lung disease under its alterative benefit plan even though 
chemical exposure to the lung is a foreseeable risk of employment. 
Some scholars have argued that workers may fare better under some 
private plans.99  For example, Alison Morantz points out that some Texas 
private plans include “first-day coverage of lost earnings and wage 
replacement rates that are not capped by the stte’s [sic] average weekly 
 
95. Robert Wilson, The 24 Hour Oklahoma Opt Out Sham, WORKERS COMPENSATION 
(Apr. 29, 2015, 5:21 PM), www.insurors.org/pdf/The-24-Hour-Oklahoma-Opt-Out-Sham.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LH7T-KSX3]. 
96. For example, in Oklahoma, Ms. Jenkins, a single mother of four who worked at 
ResCare, Inc., the nation’s largest privately-owned home health care agency, was injured while 
breaking up an assault between disabled clients.  Id.  The event occurred in full view of Ms. 
Jenkins’s supervisor and she sought medical treatment at the emergency room directly after her 
shift.  Id.  Ms. Jenkins failed to call the 1-800 number designated under the employer’s plan 
within twenty-four hours of her injury and she was denied “all medical and disability benefits.”  
Id.  In Robert Wilson’s account, Ms. Jenkins did not call the designated number “until the 27th 
hour, while she was at the company doctors [sic] office.”  Id. 
97. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 9(a–b) (2018). 
98. See Burke, supra note 78, at 416–17. 
99. See NATHAN BACCHUS ET AL., ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS, RISK & INS. MGMT. SOC’Y 3 (2015), https://www.rims.org/
RiskKnowledge/RISKKnowledgeDocs/AlternativesWorkersComp_paper_1062015_92524.pd
f [https://perma.cc/BV8K-NS77]; Chris Patterson & John Colyandro, Workers’ Compensation: 
Making It Work for Texans, POL’Y PERSP. 1, 7 (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.txccri.org/
content/2005-02-workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q5C-BRSS]; PETER ROUSMANIERE & JACK 
ROBERTS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DEREGULATION ALERT: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO 
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wage”  and an overall “decline in severe, traumatic injury claims.”100  Still, 
much of the support for opt-out has been geared towards business friendly 
economic policy and the paring down of bureaucratic control, not injured 
worker access to fair and appropriate benefits. 
III. VASQUEZ V. DILLARD’S, INC. 
Due to the unique makeup of each state’s workers’ compensation 
statute, few state workers’ compensation cases create national attention.  
Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Vasquez v. Dillard’s, 
Inc.101 has been touted by opt-out opponents and scholars as the most 
meaningful workers’ compensation case in the past twenty years.102 
In the fall of 2016, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the OEIBA 
unconstitutional, after only three years in existence, pursuant to the 
Oklahoma Constitution’s ban on “special laws.”103  The court found that 
the statute created “impermissible, unequal, and disparate treatment of a 
select group of injured workers.”104 
The etiology of the litigation stems from neck and shoulder 
aggravation injuries suffered by Dillard’s department store employee, 
Jonnie Yvonne Vasquez, while working in 2014.105  Dillard’s had been 
approved as a “qualified employer” under the OEIBA and processed 
workers’ compensation claims under its own alternative benefit plan.  The 
compensability of Ms. Vasquez’s claim was denied under Dillard’s plan 
 
100. Alison D. Morantz, Rejecting the Grand Bargain: What Happens When Large 
Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation?, 50 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Res., Working Paper 
No. 16-007, 2016), made available at https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
16-007.pdf [https://perma.cc/C85K-ZA7J]. 
101. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 787 (Okla. 2016). 
102. Alan S. Pierce, Workers’ Comp Matters, LEGAL TALK NETWORK (Dec. 29, 2017), 
https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2017/12/new-york-workers-
compensation-changes-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/8C63-GKVG].  Michael Gruber, the former 
president of the Workers Injury Law & Advocacy Group (WILG) notes specifically that the 
Vasquez decision served as a “serious damper in the momentum of the Opt-Out threat 
throughout the southeastern part of the United States.”  Id. 
103. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775.  “The core provision of the Opt Out Act . . . creates 
impermissible, unequal, disparate treatment of a select group of injured workers.”  Id. at 770 
(footnote omitted); see OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59. 
104. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775. 
105. Id. at 770.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address the merits of Ms. 
Vasquez’s claim and left the issue to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission on 
remand.  Id. at 776. 
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and Ms. Vasquez appealed the decision to Oklahoma’s Workers’ 
Compensation Commission (WCC).106 
A. Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission Ruling 
The WCC ruled that the OEIBA (1) deprived injured workers, under 
alternative benefit plans, equal protection of the law under the Oklahoma 
constitution; (2) equated to an unconstitutional “special law” under the 
Oklahoma Constitution; and (3) illicitly limited injured workers’ access to 
a civil remedy.107  While only the first step in the appeals process, the 
WCC’s decision was noteworthy for the opt-out movement for three 
salient reasons. 
First, the WCC held that Dillard’s alternative benefit plan was 
governed by ERISA.108  ERISA exempts from its preemption plans 
“maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable 
workmen’s compensation laws.”109  The plan under which Ms. Vasquez 
sought benefits was not “maintain[ed] solely” for workers’ compensation 
because it included “non-occupational death benefits, in addition to the 
benefits required under [the OEIBA].”110  However, the WCC reasoned 
that Dillard’s ERISA-governed alternative benefit plan was not preempted 
by ERISA because some of the benefits under its plan were required under 
the OEIBA.111  Usually courts reading ERISA hold that any state laws or 
regulations relating to a plan deemed to be an ERISA plan are 
 
106. Id. at 770.  Dillard’s originally attempted to remove the case to federal court, arguing 
that their opt-out plan was governed by ERISA and thereby subject to federal preemption.  
Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., No. CIV-15-0861-F, 2015 WL 9906300, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 
2015).  The federal district court denied removal, noting that the “action ar[ose] under the 
work[ers’] compensation laws of Oklahoma . . . and the fact that the plan . . . may be . . . an 
ERISA plan, d[id] not change the[] conclusion[].”  Id. at *2. 
107. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., No. CM-2014-11060L, ¶¶ 39, 45, 50 (Okla. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n, Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.ok.gov/wcc/documents/Vasquez.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R23R-U6XL] [hereinafter Commission Order]; see also Torrey, supra note 2, 
at 71. 
108. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 3. 
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2018) (emphasis added); see also supra Section II.C. 
110. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 3.  This type of benefit comingling had 
previously been used by Texas alternative benefit plans to successfully trigger ERISA 
preemption.  See Hernandez v. Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., 282 F.3d 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that Texas alternative benefit plans were preempted by ERISA because the plans were 
not “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with Texas workers’ compensation law”). 
111. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 3. 
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preempted.112  The WCC’s holding, in essence, alleged some sort of state 
administrative oversight of ERISA plans. 
Second, the WCC considered itself a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” to hear Ms. Vasquez’s ERISA claim.113  Under ERISA, a 
civil action may be brought by a beneficiary of an ERISA plan “to recover 
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan.”114  It is important to note that Section 502(a)(1)(B) of 
ERISA only contemplates prosecuting an appeal through civil action 
under the terms an ERISA governed plan, not through an administrative 
procedure like a workers’ compensation appeal.115 
Only two types of courts—state courts of competent jurisdiction and 
district courts of the United States—have jurisdiction over ERISA 
claims.116  In order to be a state court of competent jurisdiction, the WCC 
opined that the Oklahoma legislature deemed it a court of competent 
jurisdiction under the OIEBA pursuant to the following language: 
Commission shall act as the court of competent jurisdiction under 29 
U.S.C.A.  Section 1132(e)(1), and shall possess adjudicative authority 
to render decisions in individual proceedings by claimants to recover 
benefits due to the claimant under the terms of the claimant’s plan, to 
enforce the claimant’s rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify 
the claimant’s rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.117 
The legislature seemly set up the WCC as a court of competent 
jurisdiction to hear ERISA claims under alternative benefit plans.  The 
problem with this reading of the OEIBA is that ERISA “supersede[s] any 
and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit 
plan.”118  The “relate to” preemption has been broadly defined by the 
Supreme Court to include any state laws “specifically designed to affect 
employee benefit plans.”119 The Court has held that a state law that 
 
112. See Hernandez, 282 F.3d at 361–63; see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 
S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016) (finding Vermont statute, as applied to ERISA plans, invalidated by 
ERISA’s express pre-emption clause). 
113. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 7; see Torrey, supra note 2, at 67. 
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
115. Id. (explicitly stating “[a] civil action may be brought”). 
116. Id. § 1132(e)(1). 
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 211(b)(5) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 
381 P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016); Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶¶ 6–7. 
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
119. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (“[S]tate laws 
which are ‘specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans’ are pre-empted under 
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references or has a connection with ERISA will trigger ERISA preemption 
of the state law.120  It seems inconsistent with a clear reading of ERISA 
that the Oklahoma legislature could allow employers to create ERISA 
plans and also allow state laws, which are preempted by ERISA, to govern 
those plans. 
Third, the WCC held it had authority to determine a constitutional 
question.121  It is well recognized that “[t]he threshold issue in any judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceeding is whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over 
the subject matter.”122  Unlike courts of general jurisdiction, the subject 
matter jurisdiction of state administrative agencies is often narrowly 
defined by the agency’s enabling statute(s) or the state’s constitution.  
Most state worker compensation statutes narrowly define the authority of 
the administrative agency charged with facilitating workers’ 
compensation benefits to the adjudication of claims.123 
At the outset of its analysis on jurisdiction of constitutional questions, 
the WCC noted that administrative agencies “do not have the authority to 
determine constitutional questions.”124  The WCC reasoned that since “the 
Oklahoma legislature . . . established the [WCC] as the court of competent 
jurisdiction in Section 211” of the OEIBA, in regard to jurisdiction over 
ERISA claims, the legislature had also conferred it with the authority to 
determine state constitutional questions.125 
 
§ 514(a).” (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 
(1988))). 
120. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 US 85, 96–97 (1983).  Furthermore, if a state law 
directly conflicts with ERISA, the state law is preempted by ERISA.  See also District of 
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1992) (citations omitted) 
(“Under § 514(a), ERISA pre-empts any state law that refers to or has a connection with covered 
benefit plans . . . even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is 
only indirect, and even if the law is ‘consistent with ERISA’s substantive requirements.’”). 
121. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶¶ 8–9. 
122. Geoffrey R. Bonham, It Depends on the Question: Limits on the Jurisdiction of 
Administrative Agencies Over Constitutional Disputes, 13 S.C. LAW. 15, 15 (2001). 
123. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 656.704(3)(a) (2018) (stating that the authority of Oregon’s 
Workers’ Compensation Board to conduct hearings is limited to “matters concerning a claim”); 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 263-12-010(1–7) (2018) (enunciating that the Washington Board of 
Industrial Insurance Appeals has the authority to hear disputes arising under only specific listed 
statutes). 
124. Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶ 8.  The commission noted the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dow Jones & Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission 
supported the proposition that “[all] statute[s are] . . . constitutionally valid until a court of 
competent jurisdiction declares otherwise.”  Id. (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. 
Tax Comm’n, 787 P.2d 843, 845 (Okla. 1990)). 
125. Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. 
 
WALKER. MACRO. 1.16.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM  10:38 PM 
2019] OPT-OUT AND THE FOURTH ERA OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 133 
Section 211 of the OIEBA states the type of authority given to the 
Commission under its review of ERISA claims as “adjudicative authority” 
to determine claimant benefits under “claimant’s plan.”126  Language such 
as “individual proceedings” and “enforce . . . rights under the terms of the 
plan,”127 likely suggests a narrow focus within the meaning of a “court[] 
of competent jurisdiction.”128  Furthermore, the principle that the 
Oklahoma legislature has the power to convert an administrative agency 
into a court with the authority to deem a statute unconstitutional raises 
separation of powers issues.129  It is, therefore, most likely that Section 
211(5) of the OEIBA limits the WCC’s review power to the rights and 
procedures under the alternative benefit plan. 
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Ruling in Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc. 
Some commentators speculated how the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
would approach the WCC’s jurisdictional rulings.130  The court, however, 
barely mentioned WCC’s controversial reading of ERISA implications 
under the OEIBA or the limits of WCC’s jurisdiction.  Instead, the court 
considered the merits of the case and held the OEIBA unconstitutional 
pursuant to Oklahoma’s constitutional ban on “special laws.”131  The 
Oklahoma Constitution states: “Laws of a general nature shall have a 
uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be 
made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.”132  In the court’s view, 
the OEIBA “create[d the] impermissible, unequal, [and] disparate 
treatment of a select group of injured workers,”133 with alternative benefit 
plan workers having substantively subordinate rights compared to workers 
bound under Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act.134 
 
126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(5) (2018), invalidated by Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc., 
381 P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. See Michael C. Duff, Workers’ Comp Agency Declares Oklahoma Opt-Out Statute 
Unconstitutional, LEXISNEXIS: LEGAL NEWS ROOM (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/recent-cases-news-
trends-developments/posts/workers-comp-agency-declares-oklahoma-opt-out-statute-
unconstitutional (noting the difficulty of parsing out whether a legislature can delegate 
executive branch official authority that is normally regulated to the judicial branch). 
130. See id. (“The WCC’s decision may ultimately have set up a collision between ERISA 
preemption and the Oklahoma State Constitution.”). 
131. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 770 (Okla. 2016). 
132. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59. 
133. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775. 
134. Id. at 773. 
 
WALKER. MACRO. 1.16.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM  10:38 PM 
134 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:111 
When determining the constitutionality of a “special law” under the 
Oklahoma constitution, Oklahoma courts use a three-prong test.135  First, 
a court must identify a class implicated by the law in question.  If the law 
regulates all “persons or things” within the presumed class, then the law 
is a general law, at which point the analysis ends.  If the law singles out 
“persons or things” within the class for different treatment, then it is a 
“special law.”136  If it is determined a special law, the court then considers 
whether it would have been impossible for a general law to accomplish 
the same function.  Finally, the special law must be shown to substantially 
relate to a valid legislative objective.137 
Dillard’s argued that the defined class for the court’s special law 
analysis should be “all employers,” not injured workers.  In Dillard’s 
view, all employers had an equal opportunity to opt-out of the workers’ 
compensation coverage and, therefore, no “special law” had been created 
by the OEIBA.138  The court noted that the Employee Injury Benefit Act’s 
title “serve[d] as legislative intent” to indicate that the class at issue was 
“injured employees.”139 
Dillard’s further contended that, even if the OEIBA were a “special 
law,” it was constitutionally permissible because the Act was 
“substantially and reasonably related to a legitimate government 
objective.”140  Accordingly, the court will “not accept the invitation of 
employers to find a discriminatory state statute constitutional by relying 
on the interests of employers in reducing compensation costs.”141  The 
court also noted precedent under Oklahoma’s “special law” provision that 
the permissibility of a “special law” hinged on a “distinctive characteristic 
upon which a different treatment may reasonably be founded” between 
two groups within a class.142  The court found no distinctive characteristic 
for different treatment between members of the “injured workers” class. 
The court did note that the WCC had “no authority to determine the 
facial constitutionality of the Opt Out Act as a special law.”143  As such, 
the court did not affirm the WCC’s assertion that the OEIBA was, in its 
entirety, unconstitutional.  Somewhat mystifying was that the court still 
 
135. Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 822 (Okla. 1988). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 772–73. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 774. 
141. Id. (citing Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 373 P.3d 1057, 1079 (Okla. 2016)). 
142. Id. (quoting Grant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 P.3d 594, 598 (Okla. 2000)). 
143. Id. at 771. 
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considered the constitutional questions in the case even though it 
acknowledged that the WCC overstepped its authority by determining the 
OEIBA’s constitutionality.144  The court determined its authority to 
consider constitutional questions could overcome any argument that the 
“special law” issue was not properly before it.145 
As for the ERISA thicket created by the WCC’s decision, the court 
did not address the issue at all.  In a footnote, the court stated the issue had 
been waived by the parties.146  Preemption of any kind is, of course, a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction and is not waivable by either 
party.147  By not addressing the ERISA issue, the court, in one sense, 
affirmed the WCC’s self-proclaimed authority to review ERISA claims 
that fall within the workers’ compensation scheme.148 
C. Constitutional Challenges Beyond Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc. 
The workers’ compensation industry has been eager to see a supreme 
court tackle the looming questions surrounding opt-out, and while the 
Vasquez court broached this subject, it passed on many issues that will 
likely be addressed by future courts.  State and federal equal protection 
arguments, which were thoroughly briefed by the parties, were not 
addressed in the court’s opinion.149  In fact, the court specifically noted 
they did “not reach[] other constitutional challenges to the Opt Out Act 
based on denials of equal protection, due process, and access to courts” on 
state or federal grounds.150 
Even if the ERISA quagmire is avoided and state constitutional 
“special law” provisions are not implicated in future opt-out litigation, 
courts will likely struggle with an equal protection analysis.  Legal scholar 
Michael Duff notes that this is partially because the right of recovery for 
an injury is not considered fundamental in the U.S. or states’ constitutions, 
 
144. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 67. 
145. See Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 771. 
146. Id. n.12. 
147. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 68. 
148. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 783–84 (Gurich, J., concurring) (noting that the opt-out plans 
were essentially workers’ compensation plans and therefore exempt from ERISA preemption); 
Commission Order, supra note 107, ¶¶ 8–9. 
149. See Petitioner Dillard’s, Inc.’s Brief-in-Chief at 4–6, Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 
P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016) (No. 114,810), 2016 WL 6277354, at *4–6 (arguing that opt-out does not 
violate Oklahoma’s equal protection clause); Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in 
Support of Respondent Vasquez at 4, Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768 (Okla. 2016) (No. 
114,810), 2016 WL 6277355, at *4 (arguing that the OEIBA “violates the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Oklahoma and U.S. Constitutions”). 
150. Vasquez, 381 P.3d at 775. 
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and because “injured workers . . . do not make up a traditional suspect or 
quasi-suspect classification.”151 Therefore, under a typical equal 
protection analysis, injured workers, as a class, “are subject only to 
deferential rational basis review.”152  As the Supreme Court noted in 
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., under rational basis review, social 
and economic policy “must be upheld against equal protection challenge 
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification.”153  Under this highly deferential 
standard, it is possible that the OEIBA, under an equal protection 
argument, would pass state and federal constitutional muster. 
While most states do have a provision regarding “special laws” in 
their constitutions, they are often viewed as a vestige of the 1800s with 
very few state courts giving the constitutional provisions teeth.154  Future 
constitutional challenges on equal protection grounds to opt-out statutes 
that resemble OEIBA may have an uphill battle.155  Further adding to these 
difficulties is the fact that the Vasquez decision offers no persuasive value 
for other jurisdictions. 
In terms of policy, the OEIBA likely leaned too far towards the 
interests of employers.  The Vasquez court discussed the Grand Bargain’s 
quid pro quo tort immunity in its opinion and opined that, while the 
legislature was free to abolish the workers’ compensation system entirely, 
substantially reducing worker benefits while retaining an exclusive 
remedy was not appropriate.156  Perhaps, as the court suggests, repealing 
the exclusive remedy doctrine is the most assured way to uphold 
alternative benefit plans for injured workers.  As noted in Texas, full tort 
liability, mitigated through employment arbitration agreements in 
alternative benefit plans, has precedent to withstand constitutional 
challenges.157 
 
151. See Worse than Pirates, supra note 89, at 177. 
152. Id. at 178. 
153. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
154. See Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 719, 761–64 (2012). 
155. It is important to note that some state supreme courts have found that the right to 
recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right and have subjected it to a more 
rigorous review than rational basis.  E.g., Carson v. Mauer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980) 
(“We now conclude, however, that the rights involved herein are sufficiently important to 
require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial 
scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test.”). 
156. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 786–87 (Okla. 2016) (Gurich, J., 
concurring). 
157. Supra Section II.A. 
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IV. THE FOURTH ERA AND THE FUTURE OF OPT-OUT 
Prior to the Vasquez decision, the opt-out movement had gained 
momentum by introducing legislation in Tennessee and South Carolina in 
2015.158  Yet, since Vasquez, the bills in both Tennessee and South 
Carolina lost support.159  Further, Florida and Arkansas, two jurisdictions 
that appeared ripe for opt-out legislation, saw no substantial momentum 
for opt-out legislation during 2017.160 
While the Vasquez decision clearly knocked the wind out of the opt-
out movement, it is unlikely that the opinion sounded the death knell for 
alternative benefit plans or other workers’ compensation workarounds.  If 
anything, Vasquez pointed out the pitfalls of sweeping opt-out reform. 
In response to Vasquez, the Association for Responsible Alternatives 
to Workers’ Compensation (ARAWC) hired national employment and 
labor law firm Littler Mendelson P.C. in 2017 to lobby at the federal level 
for workers’ compensation reform.161  The ARAWC is reportedly funded 
by large retailers, such as Walmart, Whole Foods, and Macy’s, which 
likely have an economic incentive for national or state opt-out 
legislation.162 
Alternatively, other industries seek to disqualify their workers from 
workers’ compensation through exemptions.  In 2018, Tennessee passed 
HB 1978/SB 1967, which defined workers (marketplace contractors) who 
use a marketplace platform to find handyman type work—such as Handy 
 
158. S.B. 0721, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
Bills/109/Bill/SB0721.pdf [https://perma.cc/584F-8WJ6]; H.B. 4197, 121st Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess121_2015-2016/bills/4197.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BN3F-HAHE]. 
159. Michael Grabell, The Corporations Trying to Ditch Workers’ Compensation Hit a 
Snag, PACIFIC STANDARD (March 8, 2016), https://psmag.com/economics/the-corporations-
trying-to-ditch-workers-compensation-hit-a-snag [https://perma.cc/2BT8-HEXH]. 
160. Laura Kersey, Alternative Workers Compensation Mechanisms—What’s Happening 
With Opt-Out?, NCCI (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Pages/II_Insights_Opt-
Out.aspx [https://perma.cc/4N2F-NZY6] (explaining that Arkansas introduced legislation for 
opt-out in 2017, but it did not advance, while no bill in Florida was introduced). 
161. “In 2017, perhaps in response to the failure of the legislation and the vociferous 
opposition, ARAWC hired Littler Mendelson to promote opt-out nationally.”  Emily A. 
Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work Injuries in the United 
States, 1900-2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891, 952–53 (2017). 
162. Id.; Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to 
Ditch Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-
corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp [https://perma.cc/A5WL-UCBL] (outlining 
how large corporations reap monetary incentives from opt-out legislation). 
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or Takl—as merchant contractors exempt from workers’ compensation.163  
While politically the legislation was specifically targeting handymen, the 
law broadly defines “marketplace contractor” as any individual that 
utilizes an app to connect with third-parties for work and compensation.164  
Some have argued that the breadth of the definition could allow “any 
business providing virtually any service by way of ‘online-enabled 
application, software, website, or system that enables the provision of 
services’” to exempt its workers from Tennessee’s workers’ compensation 
system.165 
Tennessee, like Oklahoma, has a constitutional ban on special laws 
that could be used to argue against the disparate treatment of “merchant 
contractor” injured workers.166  Yet unlike Vasquez, where injured 
workers subject to alternative benefit plans were precluded from accessing 
benefits through the workers’ compensation system,167 the Tennessee law 
actively reclassifies workers prior to their invitation (or non-invitation) 
into the workers’ compensation system.168  If a “special laws” argument 
were to be brought against the Tennessee law, an injured “merchant 
contractor” may have to first show that “merchant contractors” are not 
independent contractors, but rather employees, before a “special laws” 
claim would be entertained.  Broadly reclassifying certain occupational 
relationships in such a way as to fall outside compulsory workers’ 
compensation coverage may be an effective opt-out alternative for 
industries looking to sidestep the courts. 
The federal government has also weighed in on the opt-out debate.  
In 2016, the Department of Labor (D.o.L.) issued a report critical of 
 
163. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-8-101 (2018); 2018 Tenn. Pub. Acts 648; see Michael C. 
Duff, New Tennessee “Gig” Law: “Handyman Special” or New Flavor of Opt-Out, L. 
PROFESSOR BLOG NETWORK (Mar. 20, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
workerscomplaw/2018/03/new-tennessee-gig-law-handyman-special-or-new-flavor-of-opt-
out.html [https://perma.cc/JR7P-RBE2] [hereinafter “Gig” Law].  Handy was a corporate 
sponsor for HB 1978/ SB 1967.  Lydia DePillis, For Gig Economy Workers in These States, 
Rights Are at Risk, CNN BUSINESS: CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2018 4:54 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/14/news/economy/handy-gig-economy-workers/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/U3QZ-M27J]. 
164. § 50-8-101. 
165. See “Gig” Law, supra note 163. 
166. The legislature has no power to pass laws “for the benefit of individuals inconsistent 
with the general laws of the land” or to “pass any law granting to any 
individual . . . exemptions . . . by the same law extended to any member of the community, who 
may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law.”  TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8. 
167. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 784–86 (Okla. 2016). 
168. § 50-8-10.  The Tennessee law’s broad definition of “marketplace contractor” could 
inadvertently create a large class of workers without access to workers compensation benefits. 
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worker benefits available under most state workers’ compensation 
statutes.169  The then U.S. D.o.L. Secretary, Thomas Perez, was also on 
record calling opt-out “a pathway to poverty for people who get injured 
on the job.”170  It is possible that the D.o.L. may shift its position on 
workers’ compensation benefits under the Trump administration to more 
closely align with the economic interests of employers.  While it is 
unlikely that a federal takeover of state workers’ compensation will occur 
in the current climate of government downsizing, it is possible that a shift 
in the federal attitude on workers’ compensation may empower opt-out 
proponents to pursue future legislation.171 
As previously noted, the last period of sweeping state legislative 
reforms that benefitted workers were in response to a proposed federal 
takeover of state workers’ compensation schemes.172  Perhaps the only 
way to cogently determine opt-out’s viability would be for the Supreme 
Court to weigh in—the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
constitutionality of the exclusive remedy doctrine of workers’ 
compensation since 1917.173 
CONCLUSION 
This new fourth era of workers’ compensation is truly unique from 
prior eras of reform.  Whereas access to medical benefits and time loss 
was the bargained for right of an injured worker, that right is now being 
repackaged as just another benefit to be comingled among the many 
benefits that employers may offer.174 
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It is far too early to tell whether Vasquez was a blip on the radar, or 
the beginning of a concerted effort by multi-state employers to break away 
from the traditional century-old workers’ compensation model.  If opt-out 
proponents successfully lobby for legislation allowing ERISA to divest 
state agencies from any meaningful oversight, it will likely end in another 
state supreme court decision with resounding effect. 
It is hard to determine whether opt-out announces a true shift in social 
consciousness or merely the influence of strong lobbying.  However, the 
use of sponsored legislation by industry to leave the Grand Bargain does 
leave labor with little negotiating leverage.  A hundred years ago, labor 
and industry were willing to sit down and compromise to ensure both 
parties had security.  Now, it seems industry may want to opt-out of any 
further discourse. 
